Leibniz’s divine possibles are still only subjective representations.

Evidence

Actually the reality of the possible is uniquely that of the divine thought! This means that it has being as thought which has not been realized. Of course the idea of subjectivity has been here pushed to its limit, for we are dealing with a divine consciousness, not mine; and if we have at the outset made a point of confusing subjectivity and finitude, subjectivity disappears when the understanding becomes infinite. … But in the latter case we do not get out of the subjective. If then we define possible as non-contradictory, it can have being only as the thought of a being prior to the real world or prior to the pure consciousness of the world such as it is. In either case the possible loses its nature as possible and is reabsorbed in the subjective being of the representation. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 377

Categorization

• DEFINE: Shows why Sartre treats even Leibniz’s absolute possibles as collapsing back into the subjective — key step toward his own non-subjective account of the possible.
• XREF: The claim that a mere potency/‘idea-force’ cannot escape subjectivity anticipates Sartre’s own conclusion that the possible must be grounded in the for-itself’s projection toward its future — the systematic backdrop relevant to Beauvoir’s ethics of situated freedom. — connects to: Leibnizian possibility is epistemic, relative only to our ignorance
• yield-rescued: below the book’s yield-target cutoff, included anyway for connecting to: Leibnizian possibility is epistemic, relative only to our ignorance

Broader Connections

• Leibnizian possibility is epistemic, relative only to our ignorance #corroborates (0.85)