Legal authority depends on culturally interpreted moral categories

Evidence

It is a live possibility that some cultures do not distinguish moral from non-moral norms and thus that the moral domain fails to be a psychological universal whose evolution calls for explanation (see also Machery & Mallon 2010). — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 489 (#complicates, via linked claim)

A customary practice of those whose role it is to apply primary rules, a rule of recognition provides criteria of legal validity by determining which acts create law. So the fundamental constitution of a legal system does not rest on moral justifications or logical presuppositions, but on this customary social rule created by ‘a complex … practice of the courts, officials, and private persons’ (107). — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 56 (#complicates, via linked claim)

James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense (New York: Free Press, 1993); Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), esp. chaps. 1 and 4; and for a brief overview, Frances V. Harbour, “Basic Moral Values: A Shared Core,” Ethics and International Affairs, 9 (1995), 155–170. — Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the…, 955 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim
  • XREF: connects to: Courts sanction perceived moral character rather than the formal legal charge. — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of…, 823; Legal systems rest on customary social rules rather than moral foundations — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 56; Fixed moral universals regulate and restrain changeable legal norms — Wael Hallaq, Restating Orientalism: A Critique of…, 658 (+11 more)

Broader Connections