Law should presume universal knavery while judges presume individual honesty

Evidence

Besides, my notion is, that the law, in guarding itself against men, ought to do just the contrary of what the judge should do in trying them, especially where there is nothing to be lost by it. The business, you know, of the judge, is to presume them all honest till he is forced to suspect the contrary: the business of the law is to conclude them all, without exception, to be the greatest knaves and villains that can be imagined. — Jeremy Bentham, The Panopticon Writings, 201

Categorization

• DEFINE: Distinguishes two distinct epistemic stances — judicial presumption of innocence vs. legislative presumption of universal bad faith.
• XREF: Connects directly to Foucault’s account of how disciplinary institutions design on maximal-suspicion assumptions rather than trust.