Kant reverses the protector’s command into a citizen’s claim over the sovereign.

Evidence

What we have here is a reversal in the schema of the constitutive relations implied in war-waging sovereignty. In a republican context, as Kant explains in the case of the right of war, it is necessary to “derive this right from the duty of the sovereign to the people (not the reverse).” The obligatory relation is reversed. In its initial version, the one that Schmitt borrowed directly from the relations of vassaldom, at the same time universalizing it so as to convert it into a kind of transcendental principle of politics, the protector-sovereign declared: “I protect you, so I am in command.” But now, with Kant, the republican citizen replies: “You, the sovereign, are exposing my life, so you are obliged to obey me.” — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 573

Categorization

  • XREF: Ties to Schmitt — a figure central to the author’s wider argument about sovereignty. — connects to: War reverses the protection-obedience relation so subjects protect the sovereign. — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 559; Kant questioned the legal right of states to use subjects for war. — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 569