Juridical theory treats power as a commodity owned and alienable by contract.

Evidence

In the case of the classic juridical theory of power, power is regarded as a right which can be possessed in the way one possesses a commodity, and which can therefore be transferred or alienated, either completely or partly, through a juridical act or an act that founds a right—it does not matter which, for the moment—thanks to the surrender of something or thanks to a contract. — Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 32

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the juridical/contract model of power that Foucault opposes with his relational, exercised-not-possessed model.
• XREF: Connects to the liberal-contract tradition from Hobbes/Locke that the Islamophobia readings’ critique of rights discourse will build on. — connects to: The juridical discourse of sovereignty has dominated Western analysis of power. — Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 13; Analyzing power requires abandoning the juridical-representation model entirely — Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 17; A legal contract channels stored political power toward private purposes (+1 more)

Related

• Analyzing power requires abandoning the juridical-representation model entirely (similarity 0.84)
• The juridical discourse of sovereignty has dominated Western analysis of power. (similarity 0.83)
• Western thought has no representation of power outside the legal model (similarity 0.79)
• Western juridical thought was built around and for royal power. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• A legal contract channels stored political power toward private purposes #exemplifies (0.92)
• Western juridical thought was built around and for royal power. #corroborates (0.85) — Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 43