Judicial disagreement about precedent is a difference of philosophy, not law

Evidence

When the question came before us squarely, we held the other way, though by a closely divided vote. I do not challenge the learning ane Dower of the majority opinion. ‘here is no gainsaying its conclusion if the judicial function is merely static. What seemed to be a division as to the law was in truth a difference of philosophy. Conceiving the judicial function as dynamic, I am still impressed with the conviction that there was here a fitting opportunity to uproot an ancient evil. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 2554

Categorization

• DEFINE: Cardozo’s distinction between the static and the dynamic conception of the judicial function.
• XREF: Polyad law thread — Cardozo here resolves what ch4 called ‘judicial discretion’ into static vs. dynamic philosophies of judging, and echoes ch7 ch34’s ‘judges are layered products of … conditioning’ by locating the split in philosophy. — connects to: Disagreement over the jury is fundamentally a political-philosophical debate — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 892