Interpreting a group’s self-descriptions requires avoiding both scientific neutrality and uncritical acceptance
Evidence
The interpretive view, I want to argue, avoids the two equal and opposite mistakes: on one hand, of ignoring self-descriptions [of white identity, white culture, white experience] altogether, and attempting to operate in some neutral “scientific” language; on the other hand, of taking these descriptions with ultimate seriousness, so that they become incorrigible. Social theory in general, and political theory especially, is very much in the business of correcting common sense understanding. — David Theo Goldberg, John Solomos, A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies, 783
Categorization
- DEFINE: Defines the interpretive view as steering between ignoring self-descriptions and treating them as incorrigible.
- XREF: Mirrors the double bind the author identifies in Frye’s white critique — methodological version of ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’. — connects to: Scientific neutrality is itself metaphysical and masks domination — Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 43; Sociology cannot address group self-understanding without historical interpretation and dialectical communication — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History,…, 2428; Ethnographic interviews aim at informants’ self-understanding, not factual truth. — Alice E. Marwick, Status Update: Celebrity, Publicity,…, 947 (+2 more)
- QUESTION: How has Taylor’s interpretive view been critiqued since, and does it survive charges of relativism from both sides?