Interpretation has two genuine tasks distinct from filling gaps in deficient rules
Evidence
In a brief but much-cited article on Spurious Interpretation, Dean Pound takes his theme from Austin’s analysis of the problems of … The difficulty calling for interpretation na be, (a) which of two or more co-ordnate rules to apply, or to determine what the lawmaker intended to prescribe by a given rule, or (c) to meet deficiencies or excesses in rules imperfectly conceived or enacted. The first two are cases for genuine interpretation. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1973
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: Plain-meaning interpretation itself presupposes a policy rule favoring literal reading — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1989; Mediocre mechanical interpretation can be worse than no interpretation at all — Freeman Tilden, Interpreting Our Heritage, 567; Structural interpretation reads the gaps rather than the unified whole — Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious, 1394 (+2 more)
Broader Connections
- Structural interpretation reads the gaps rather than the unified whole
#qualifies(0.78) — Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious, 1394 - Reading a speculative proposition requires transforming meaning through interpretation
#qualifies(0.75) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 1225 - Grammar’s subject-predicate form dictates a referential, non-textual interpretive procedure.
#qualifies(0.72)