International trade law is far more institutionally organized than environmental law

Evidence

Complicating the problem is the stark contrast between the international institutional disorganization surrounding environmental protection and the relatively sophisticated organization surrounding areas of international trade policy. Now administered by the WTO, the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GATT) have proved to be a powerful and effective source of international policy development and enforcement. While many in the environmental community frequently complain about the tendency of the WTO and, formerly, the GATT itself to trump competing social values, including environmental protection, in favor of free trade, environmental regulators and environmentalists cannot help but be jealous of the WTO’s institutional authority. — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 1038

Categorization

• XREF: The asymmetry of institutional capacity between trade and environment — connects to reader’s legal-institutions thread across courses. — connects to: Environmental law’s structure conflicts with criminal law’s core assumptions — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 862; Environmental standard-setting is institutionally unsuited to the legislative arena — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 838; Nuisance law’s vagueness drove environmental law toward detailed statutory standards — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 594

Broader Connections

• Environmental standard-setting is institutionally unsuited to the legislative arena #corroborates (0.85) — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 838
• Environmental law’s structure conflicts with criminal law’s core assumptions #corroborates (0.75) — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 862
• Nuisance law’s vagueness drove environmental law toward detailed statutory standards #qualifies (0.75) — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 594