Internalization models of norms cannot explain how norms first arise.

Evidence

In this context, the motive of personal safety is so enormous that it seems utterly implausible that it is trumped by the motive of being morally or legally right for almost anyone. Nevertheless, many people insist that the rule is morally binding first and foremost. Models of norms commonly suppose that a norm becomes internalized and that the individual is thereafter driven by an actual preference for adhering to the norm (Scott 1971). This does not allow for an explanation of the rise of the norm in the first place. Psychological supervenience would do so. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 422

Categorization

• DEFINE: States the explanatory gap psychological supervenience is designed to fill.
• XREF: The origin-of-norms problem echoes Hardin’s broader argument that trust and norms are interest-grounded rather than freestanding moral facts, tying back to the chapter’s central claim.