Internal Spanish rivalries prolonged the Alpujarras revolt by scuttling an early negotiated surrender

Evidence

One might have thought that Mond´ejar’s ability to reduce the rebels in the western Alpujarras so rapidly to the point of potential surrender would vindicate him, but this was not the case. Deza and the Granadan lawyers denigrated the viceroy’s willingness to negotiate, representing it as a manifestation of his deep-seated predilection for his Morisco subjects. The settlement that could have been had on terms satisfactory to the Crown in March thus slipped out of Mond´ejar’s grasp. Aben Humeya went from being a fugitive who was finding it difficult to survive to seeing recruits flocking in eager to avenge the sufferings inflicted by the invading troops of the marqu´es de los V´elez on their villages. Understandable tension and disagreements between Mond´ejar and the marqu´es de los V´elez were blamed on the former. And this opened the way for Philip to send in from outside his half-brother, Don John of Austria, appointing him as supreme commander over both. From this point on, from March 1569 to April 1570, we may distinguish a yearlong middle phase of the conflict. — L. P. Harvey, Muslims in Spain, 1500 to 1614, 1026

Categorization

• XREF: Pattern of hawkish officials blocking conciliatory settlements echoes colonial/military dynamics elsewhere in the reader’s library on counterinsurgency and dispossession.