Intermediaries must attach trust to their own reputations, not create direct seller-buyer trust

Evidence

One reason the mafioso might prefer to offer trust in conjunction with discouraging competition is that if that trust were too public he would then be unable to enforce the collection of his fee from all sellers, who would find free-riding particularly easy. He might also find it difficult to check on all transactions carried out by those sellers he guarantees, with the risk of losing his reputation if a ‘lemon’ were to be sold behind his back. A further reason why his intervention as guarantor must always be identifiable — linked, that is, to specific transactions — is to make sure that the buyer knows that if he gets a good deal this is due to the mafioso’s protection and not to the independent honesty of the seller, which could foster the growth of trust directly between buyer and seller and put the mafioso out of business. — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2245

Categorization

• XREF: Explains why the sighted wife must monopolize verification in Saramago’s blindness world; direct trust formation would bypass the guarantor entirely.