Interference can be non-arbitrary when institutions force officials to track citizens’ interests
Evidence
The second point I wish to emphasize about domination is that while the enjoyment of dominating power over another is consistent with never actually interfering, it is equally true that one agent may actually interfere with another without dominating that person. The public official or authority who interferes with people in a way that is forced to track their interests and ideas fails to enjoy subjugating power over the person affected. The official is subject to such screening and sanctioning devices, at least in the ideal, that they can be relied upon to act on a non-factional basis: on a basis that is supported by non-sectional interests and ideas. They interfere, since they operate on the basis of coercive law, but their interference is non-arbitrary. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 331
Categorization
- DEFINE: Crystallizes the republican distinction between domination and mere interference — state coercion need not enslave.
- XREF: connects to: A constitutional authority can end domination only if it tracks citizens’ shared interests — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 343; Interference is non-dominating when structured by shared-interest conditions and contestable penalties — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 128; Non-arbitrary interference tracking the agent’s interests does not compromise freedom — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 142 (+3 more)