Interests are relational and can include other beings without ceasing to be one’s own.

Evidence

The weak sense of ‘interest’, as we have seen, can include cases where your interests include those of other people; that is to say, relational interests. Thus it does not follow from the assumption that because people make choices according to their own preferences (which amounts to little more than the claim that their choices are their own choices and not someone else’s), these preferences do not take into account the interests or preferences of other people; that they are, in this sense, ‘selfish interests’. Similarly in the human case, it does not follow that because humans arrive at some set of values and choose according to it, these choices only reflect the interests of humans, and cannot involve essential relation to the interests of some other species. Just as BE is refuted by examples of non-self-interested behaviour, so B is refuted by examples of behaviour which does not just reflect the interest of humankind. The real ambiguity then is between relational and self-contained interests, and their conflation is designed to convince us that interests must be selfcontained, in the individual case making ineliminable reference only to that individual’s well-being, and in the human case only to the wellbeing of other humans. The weak sense of ‘interest’ then is inclusive, and allows for relational cases, while the strong sense implies selfcontainment, and does not. — Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 558

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the relational vs self-contained senses of interest, the book’s key retort to both egoism and human chauvinism.
• XREF: Echoes critiques of the atomistic liberal self from feminist theory, environmental philosophy, and Merchant; relevant across the polyad’s shared thread on dualism. — connects to: Caring for another’s flourishing need not displace one’s own interest. — Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 569; Interests are shared either causally or by genuine adoption of another’s welfare; Relational traits like rulership can detach from their needed counterpart and persist alone — Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, 6725 (+3 more)
• SEED: The ‘interest’ ambiguity could anchor an essay on how seemingly neutral economic language smuggles in the self-contained-master model of value.

Broader Connections

• Interests are shared either causally or by genuine adoption of another’s welfare #expands (0.95)
• Trust rests on encapsulated interests that can be shared causally or adopted. #exemplifies (0.78) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 656
• Trust is nearly complete when one party assumes the other’s interests as their own #exemplifies (0.75) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 657
• Relational traits like rulership can detach from their needed counterpart and persist alone #complicates (0.72) — Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, 6725
• Trusting someone means their interests encapsulate one’s own interests. #exemplifies (0.72) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 66