Interest as pleasure-pain desire causes all thought and naming

Evidence

Goodness and badness, of all qualities experienced or imaginable, these are the very first that would present themselves to notice, these are the very first that would obtain names. Interest i.e. desire of pleasure and of exemption from pain, being, in some shape or other, the source of every thought, as well as the cause of every action (and, in particular, amongst others of every action by which names are employed in the designation of persons and of things, – names plainly and immediately expressive of the two opposite modes of relation, in which those objects would be continually bearing relation to each man’s interest, as above explained) would be among the very earliest to which the faculty of discourse would give existence. — Jeremy Bentham, The Panopticon Writings, 482

Categorization

• XREF: This grounds the whole utilitarian psychology in ontology — interest-as-principle connects directly to the panopticon’s calculus of pain and pleasure. — connects to: Pleasure follows from desire rather than desire being caused by pleasure — Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 2231; Interests crystallize into perceived moral commitments through psychological supervenience.; Blasé attitude results from nerves exhausted by rapid contradictory stimuli — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 752 (+2 more)
• DEEPTHINKING: Bentham derives language and concept-naming itself from self-interest — an audacious move that makes his whole system (including the panopticon’s discipline) follow from a single ontological-psychological axiom.

Broader Connections

• Pleasure follows from desire rather than desire being caused by pleasure #contradicts (0.80) — Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 2231
• Interests crystallize into perceived moral commitments through psychological supervenience. #expands (0.72)
• Blasé attitude results from nerves exhausted by rapid contradictory stimuli #exemplifies (0.72) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 752