Index funds profit more from suppressing competition than enabling it

Evidence

12 For example, Vanguard is the largest shareholder in both Ford and General Motors. How would Vanguard benefit from allowing real competition between the two? — Yanis Varoufakis, Technofeudalism, 936

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to common-agency/portfolio overlap work like Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu on common ownership reducing product market competition. — connects to: The index inclusion anomaly undermines the advice to invest in index funds — Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial…, 461; Institutional investors’ cross-ownership creates anticompetitive power needing limits — Andrew deWaard, Derivative Media: How Wall Street…, 1384; Common ownership of competing firms suppresses competition and inflates prices
• ADDENDUM: Grafts onto the ‘trees as infrastructure’ logic only loosely, but tracks the ‘On Sacrifice’ structural-incentive style: ownership concentration silently shaping fates.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Yanis Varoufakis, Technofeudalism: What Killed Capitalism, 936

Broader Connections

• Common ownership of competing firms suppresses competition and inflates prices #corroborates (0.90)
• Institutional investors’ cross-ownership creates anticompetitive power needing limits #corroborates (0.85) — Andrew deWaard, Derivative Media, 1384