Increasing cognitive complexity of one’s own identities reduces out-group prejudice without abandoning those identities

Evidence

More importantly, however, strategies that seek to change variations in social identity complexity should not require individuals to change categorizations; they should merely seek to influence the way they think about their in-group memberships in a more complex, differentiated manner. Individuals need not thus forsake any valued identities they may hold (a key criticism surrounding the common in-group identity model, see Brewer & Gaertner, 2001), nor do they need to attend closely to others’ multiple group memberships (as is required in crossedcategorization approaches). Merely achieving variations in social identity complexity surrounding individuals’ multiple in-group categories may thus be sufficient to yield positive out-group variations. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 587

Categorization

  • XREF: Complements the reader’s Allport reassessment thread on prejudice: where Allport mapped direct-contact and categorization mechanisms, this documents a low-cost cognitive lever on prejudice that requires neither contact redesign nor identity change. — connects to: Superordinate identities reduce bias and can mitigate perceived threat between groups. — Blake M. Riek, Eric W. Mania, and Samuel L. Gaertner, Intergroup Threat and Outgroup…, 174
  • QUESTION: The central intervening mechanism is said to be ā€˜the way they think about their in-group memberships’ as more differentiated — worth chasing what experimental manipulations actually changed cognition versus mere exposure.
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 587