I believe I must endorse both these observations. A glance at the law reviews dishearteningly confirms that the universities produce an enormous amount of legal criticism—really commentary on criticism—that exhibits little fresh insight, and little appreciation for what insights it encounters.

Evidence

Often an alleged attack on the “reasoning” of the court is really a disagreement with the value judgment implicit in the court’s major premise—a disagreement with the court’s selection and interpretation of the applicable legal precept. — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 451 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Legal critique often masks a disagreement over underlying value judgments. — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 451; Legal criticism improves when focused on specific premises and syllogisms. — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 451; Winter’s entire essay is structured around such small coups de theatre, which culminate in announcements of such banality that they are made ludicrous by the portentous, jargon-ridden analysis that precedes them. Does anyone think that Wittgenstein would be shattered to be informed of such revelations? Or that it is really ‘news’ that we use knowledge from one domain in assessing another? Or that meaning is dependent on experience? To maintain otherwise would turn autonomy into autism. (+1 more)

Broader Connections