Hussen’s mass firing of corrupt officials stunned a public accustomed to tribal favoritism

Evidence

On the night of January 27–28, now known among some top local Western educated officials as the St. Bartholomew’s massacre, the Council of Ministers met for 19 straight hours and, with each minister having a chance to speak for the Director General of his ministry, went over the dossiers and made the decisions… . The government’s action was a bombshell. It was clearly evident from Embassy’s sounding of officials and public opinion that more was involved than severe administrative measures. This was a political action aimed at re-casting the modus operandi of the state. The old way of doing business was sloppily, or handing out favors to family and tribe, or seeking monetary gain in return for routine operations. And the men who were in charge of the government’s business were known to have held high office, many since independence, too often without the qualifications for the job, too many because of tribal affiliations and despite evidence that they were living beyond their salaries. This latter point is important. Corruption led to general cynicism among the public and vitiated the stated aims of this and previous governments that the welfare of the people came uppermost. Most Somalis knew that the welfare of the officials came first. True, [Hussen], from the time of his first appointment last June, has been talking about honest and efficient government. Apparently, no one was really convinced that he would or could make a general house cleaning… . The immediate man-in-the-street’s reaction was therefore one of surprised delight. The prime minister had done what he promised; he had thrown the rascals out. The reaction among the discarded upper civil servants and their tribal and business connections need hardly be described. — Abdi Ismail Samatar, Africa’s First Democrats, 789

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the post-independence Somali patronage politics discussed in earlier chapters of this book.