Hobbes redefined liberty as the absence of coercion rather than non-domination

Evidence

Hobbes begins by presenting freedom, not as non-domination, but rather as non-interference. ‘A Free-Man’, he wrote in Leviathan, ‘is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to doe what he has a will to’ (Hobbes 1968: 262). People are hindered and rendered strictly unfree for Hobbes only so far as they are physically coerced. But he allows that there is also a sense in which people are rendered unfree by bonds that coerce by threat, not by physical means: these are ‘made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them’ (Hobbes 1968: 264). — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 200

Hobbes begins by presenting freedom, not as non-domination, but rather as non-interference. ‘A Free-Man’, he wrote in Leviathan, ‘is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to doe what he has a will to’ (Hobbes 1968: 262). People are hindered and rendered strictly unfree for Hobbes only so far as they are physically coerced. But he allows that there is also a sense in which people are rendered unfree by bonds that coerce by threat, not by physical means: these are ‘made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them’ (Hobbes 1968: 264). The upshot, then, is that liberty consists in the absence of coercion: liberty proper in the absence of physical coercion, liberty in the broader sense—the liberty of subjects, as he calls it—in the absence of coercion by threat (on Hobbes on liberty, see Skinner 1990^). — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 200

Categorization

  • XREF: Contrasts liberty-as-noninterference with the positive-project liberty-as-empowerment framing that matters for solidarity research. — connects to: Contrasting liberty with slavery reveals a non-domination rather than non-interference theory of freedom. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 170; Treating liberty as alienable property historically legitimated slavery and absolutism; Freedom can be reconceived as non-domination rather than non-interference or self-mastery — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 1207 (+3 more)
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 200

Broader Connections