Historical prediction really expresses practical political effort, not scientific knowledge

Evidence

Since it “appears”, by a strange inversion of the perspectives, that the natural sciences provide us with the ability to foresee the evolution of natural processes, historical methodology is “scientifically” conceived only if, and in so far as, it permits one “abstractly” to foresee the future of society. Hence the search for essential causes, indeed for the “first cause”, for the “cause of causes”. But the Theses on Feuerbach had already criticised in advance this simplistic conception. In reality one can “scientifically” foresee only the struggle, but not the concrete moments of the struggle, which cannot but be the results of opposing forces in continuous movement, which are never reducible to fixed quantities since within them quantity is continually becoming quality. In reality one can “foresee” to the extent that one acts, to the extent that one applies a voluntary effort and therefore contributes concretely to creating the result “foreseen”. Prediction reveals itself thus not as a scientific act of knowledge, but as the abstract expression of the effort made, the practical way of creating a collective will. — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 1558

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines what genuine historical foresight amounts to against the positivist model of prediction borrowed from natural science.
• XREF: This rejection of mechanical causality and first-cause thinking feeds directly into later critical-theory critiques of positivist social science and links to the Frankfurt School’s attack on the technical knowledge interest. — connects to: Scientific uncertainty reflects political context, not deficient understanding — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 684