High-visibility markets with valuable fixed locations invite protection rackets, while predatory crimes resist them

Evidence

In some branches of the crime business there is little point in collusion. As Schelling (1984) explains: “Pickpockets and burglars and car thieves, embezzlers and people who cheat on their income tax, shoplifters and muggers and bank robbers, usually do not go around killing each other. There is nothing in it for them. Two bank robbers who pick the same day for the same bank may have to fight for the privilege if they arrive at the same time, and two purse snatchers who grab the same purse may fight for possession; but these are rare instances” (183-184). Cartels would serve no purpose here. By contrast, illegal gambling, loan-sharking, liquor and cigarette smuggling, and drug dealing are notoriously more conflict-ridden, and hence protected. The crucial difference is not that the former activities are predatory while the latter supply eager customers with desirable goods, although this is a common distinction in many criminological studies. Beggars, for instance, are often involved in protection rackets despite the fact that they have nothing to sell. It is rather, as Schelling points out, that certain markets are more difficult to monopolize and police, whereas others-for instance, those that rely on high visibility to attract customers and compete for attractive locations-make protection both feasible and worthwhile. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 611

Categorization

• XREF: Directly extends Schelling’s (1984) framework cited in the reader’s stated goal; connects plainly to Gambetta’s own core thesis of protection as the mafia’s commodity rather than the predator/victim distinction.
• SEED: An essay angle comparing which legitimate markets invite similar private-protection dynamics (parking enforcement, event venue spaces) given the same visibility-and-location logic.