Heidegger gave time two incompatible roles in Sein und Zeit

Evidence

What do we call or name time in Sein und Zeit? It would be, on the one hand, a determined moment, that of a circumscribed period in which Heidegger had proposed a contestable interpretation of time according to Hegel (as a paraphrase of Aristotle’s Physics, as a ‘vulgar’ concept or a ‘current’ concept dominated by the schema of the ïŹ‚ux, by the succession inherent to the current of the present ‘nows’, etc.). The time of Sein und Zeit (which shortly precedes the 1930 Seminar on the Phenomenology of Spirit and the verdict characterizing Hegel’s conception of time as that which has ‘passed away’) is also the choice which makes time the ‘transcendental horizon’ of the question of Being. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 105

Categorization

  • XREF: Connect: The duality of time as both vulgar flux and transcendental horizon parallels the reader’s concern with how a concept gets positioned as both object and frame.
  • QUESTION: Worth chasing: what exactly is contested in Heidegger’s reading of Hegelian time as a paraphrase of Aristotle’s Physics, and how does Malabou’s counter-reading periodize it?