Heidegger’s ontological difference separates beings from Being itself

Evidence

Heidegger sums this up by saying that Being is not itself a being. That is, it is not a defined or delineated entity of any kind. He distinguishes between the German word Seiende, which can refer to any individual entity, such as a mouse or a church door, and Sein, which means the Being that such particular beings have. (In English, one way of signalling the distinction is by using the capital ‘B’ for the latter.) He calls it the ‘ontological difference’ — from ‘ontology’, the study of what is. It is not an easy distinction to keep clear in one’s mind, but the ontological difference between Being and beings is extremely important to Heidegger. If we get confused between the two, we fall into errors — for example, settling down to study some science of particular entities, such as psychology or even cosmology, while thinking that we are studying Being itself. — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist CafĂ©, 197

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Defines the ontological difference between Seiende and Sein, a cornerstone concept of the whole tradition.
  • QUESTION: Keeps asking how ‘Being itself’ can be meaningfully talked about if it is not any entity — worth chasing later into Heidegger’s later philosophy.
  • XREF: connects to: Heidegger drew a hard line between ontic sciences and ontological philosophy — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist CafĂ©: Freedom,
, 199; Stein’s fiction anticipates Heidegger’s ontological difference between beings and Being — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist CafĂ©: Freedom,
, 209; The ontological difference distinguishes specific entities from the Being they have. (+1 more)

Broader Connections