Heidegger’s ontological being-with cannot explain concrete relations with particular others

Evidence

First of all, the ontological point of view joins here with the abstract view of the Kantian subject. To say that human reality (even if it is my human reality) “is-with” by means of its ontological structure is to say that it is-with by nature—that is, in an essential and universal capacity. Even if this affirmation were proved, it would not enable us to explain any concrete being-with. In other words, the ontological co-existence which appears as the structure of “being-in-the-world” can in no way serve as a foundation to an ontic being-with, such as, for example, the co-existence which appears in my friendship with Pierre or in the couple which Annie and I make. In fact it would be necessary to show that “being-with-Pierre” or “being-with-Annie” is a structure constitutive of my concreate-being. But this is impossible from the point of view which Heidegger has adopted. The Other in the relation “with,” taken on the ontological level, can not in fact be concretely determined any more than the directly confronted human-reality of which it is the alter ego; it is an abstract term and hence unselbständig, and it does not contain the power of becoming that Other—Pierre or Annie. Thus the relation of the MitSein can be of absolutely no use to us in resolving the psychological, concrete problem of the recognition of the Other. There are two incommunicable levels and two problems which demand separate solutions. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 703

Categorization

• XREF: This sets up the central move of the book: because Mitsein fails at the ontic level, Sartre must find the Other’s constitution elsewhere — directly relevant to Beauvoir’s own critique of how abstract ontology fails concrete lived relations. — connects to: Einfühlung and sympathy theories fail to establish the Other’s existence, only its presentation; Heidegger’s being-with is primordial co-existence, not interpersonal confrontation.; The situation is constituted from Others’ meanings rather than from being itself — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 444 (+1 more)
• DEFINE: Distinguishes ontisch (concrete, particular) from ontologisch (essential, structural) being-with — a key terminological contrast.

Broader Connections

• The situation is constituted from Others’ meanings rather than from being itself #complicates (0.75) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 444