Heidegger’s authentic-versus-inauthentic distinction left politics to heroic fatalism without causes

Evidence

The message to the reader was indistinct. If readers wanted to belong to those who exist authentically, the present would have to appear to them as inauthentic, alienated, dominated by the they' which had to be abolished in favour of the possibility of a constitution of Dasein which had not been perceived in the past, although it had unmistakably existed. But, since the they’ was seen as an existentiale', how could a more authentic constitution of Dasein than the existing one be possible? And, if the most authentic possibility was an acceptance without illusions of the thrownness of one's own there’ (Da), how could an abolition of the `they’ (which is a part of that) bring an increase in authenticity? What remained was a muted protest against existing conditions, which did not describe the causes of those conditions, and whose chief characteristic was an emotional sense of heroic fatalism. — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, 412

Heidegger’s distinction between authentic and inauthentic historical existence was enigmatic. Both modes of existence were characterized by the thrownness' of Being-in-the-world and by the past. But in the one case the past was supposed to be a possibility of authentic existence, while in the other it was merely a remnant. In the one case it was supposed to be a matter of resolute acceptance, in the other, by contrast, one of mere preservation. The message to the reader was indistinct. If readers wanted to belong to those who exist authentically, the present would have to appear to them as inauthentic, alienated, dominated by the they’ which had to be abolished in favour of the possibility of a constitution of Dasein which had not been perceived in the past, although it had unmistakably existed. But, since the they' was seen as an existentiale’, how could a more authentic constitution of Dasein than the existing one be possible? And, if the most authentic possibility was an acceptance without illusions of the thrownness of one’s own there' (Da), how could an abolition of the they’ (which is a part of that) bring an increase in authenticity? What remained was a muted protest against existing conditions, which did not describe the causes of those conditions, and whose chief characteristic was an emotional sense of heroic fatalism. — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, 412

Categorization

  • QUESTION: The philosophical incoherence Wiggershaus pinpoints — can ‘they’ be abolished if it is an existentiale — is a sharp critique worth exploring further.
  • DEEPTHINKING: A tightly argued internal critique showing how Heidegger’s existential categories undermine his own project of authentic existence; the reasoning resists compression.
  • XREF: This critique presages the Frankfurt School’s charge that Heidegger’s existentialism was politically inert—relevant to later engagement, including Habermas on Heidegger. — connects to: Heidegger’s theology offered no prospect of rescue or reconciliation — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History,…, 393; Heidegger’s philosophical vocabulary shifted with political circumstances while its core motifs stayed constant — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History,…, 2298; Heidegger’s ontology functioned as a conservative apositivism — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History,…, 2500 (+5 more)
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History,…, 412

Broader Connections