Hegel fused Aristotle’s and Kant’s definitions of time in one passage.

Evidence

Here time is simultaneously presented both according to its classical Greek, or more precisely, Aristotelian determination and according to its modern, that is to say, Kantian determination. If the analysis of the now, the definition of time as ‘a being which, in being, is not’, is effectively borrowed from Physics IV, the definition of time as ‘the pure form of sensibility’ (Hegel writes in fact: ‘Time, like space, is a pure form of sense or intuition; it is the non-sensuous sensuous (das unsinnliche Sinnliche)’) obviously comes from the Critique of Pure Reason. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 255

Categorization

• QUESTION: The dual borrowing — Aristotle for the now, Kant for form-sensibility — suggests time’s doubled conception is deliberate, worth probing whether it foreshadows the plasticity claim.