Hegel’s substance-subject rejects both hypostasis and person as trinitarian principles

Evidence

The speculative content of religion is not longer attached to the idea of ‘hypostasis’, but it is not attached to the idea of ‘person’ either. The concept of a ‘substancesubject’ neither refers to the principle of a hypostatic substance (literally, π–στασις, Sub-stanz), as the Greek Fathers argued, nor to the subjective person (persona, Person, Subjekt) of the Latin Church. In Hegelian thought, apparently, there is absolutely no place for the doctrine that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. Nor is there even, more fundamentally, a place for the idea of ‘procession’. The ‘path’ – whether as a process or µ0θ–δς – or as a ‘path’ in the sense of ‘procession’ or πρ–δς – requires two different conceptualizations. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 713

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Clarifies how ‘substance-subject’ dismantles both the Greek hypostasis and Latin person in Hegel’s dialectic — foundational definition for the plasticity concept’s trinitarian root.
  • XREF: The etymological gloss linking µ0θ–δς (method, literally a path after) and πρ–δς (procession) connects to Malabou’s broader thesis of plasticity as the path/method of becoming. — connects to: Hegel’s critics reject the introduction of negativity into God and the Trinity; Hegel’s Man-God-Philosopher triad are temporal perspectives, not fixed substances — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 287; Content’s determinateness is self-given, not externally attached, in Hegel (+1 more)

Broader Connections