Hegel’s Self is a primordial synthetic instance prior to the I-self

Evidence

To this question Hegel does have an answer: it is the ‘Self’ (Selbst). Yet do we know what this ‘Self’ is in this case? It is a primordial subjectivity, a synthetic instance earlier than the ‘I-self’: I is the System itself, the System as a Self. The System collects and is made up of all the determinations or aspects. Yet how does such a ‘Self’ have the power to decide? And how will the ‘I-Self’, in its detachment from self, be able to renounce itself in favour of this later ‘Self’? — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 1084

Categorization

• DEFINE: Distinguishes the System-as-Self (primordial subjectivity) from the empirical I-self that must renounce itself — a key conceptual distinction in Malabou’s reading.
• XREF: connects to: Hegel’s subjectivity must incorporate madness, delirium and the primordial night — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 545; For Hegel the birth of the I involves feeling oneself as an other — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 348; Hegel displaces the cogito as origin by grounding it in a larger order — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 1074

Broader Connections

• For Hegel the birth of the I involves feeling oneself as an other #expands (0.85) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 348