Hegel’s end of history allows events but denies new universal meaning.

Evidence

It is the convention of this all too-well-received idea, in this interpretative scene, in this historical perspective which is finally taken on by Malabou in her book. To say, so easily and all too simply, that there is no contingence or no ‘pure accident’ for Hegel, and hence – I translate – that a ‘perhaps’ has no place and no philosophical dignity, is an error: ‘Such a reading is erroneous.’ … But Malabou entices this necessity into its own abyss, the abyss where it loses itself, that is to say, into its own necessity, the necessity of necessity, which would be a fact or a Faktum, the fact of a necessity which remains as a fact, in itself, not necessary, and in any case not comprehensible as the necessity which he founds by depriving it of its own foundation. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 127 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Hegel’s thought allegedly renounced all future by thinking time itself. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 73; Hegel rejects the claim that every accident necessarily has meaning — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 1293; Hegel does leave room for contingency within necessity itself — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 127

Broader Connections

• Hegel does leave room for contingency within necessity itself #qualifies (0.75) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 127