Having or possessing, for Aristotle, is a state of suspended being

Evidence

Through a consideration of the temporal dimension of habit, in the human contraction of habits, it becomes possible to explicate both plasticity and the immanent temporalization of νς. In his attempt to clarify the specific nature of ις in relation to the other types of disposition, Aristotle frequently introduces the factor of time. In Metaphysics IV, 19, 20, he argues that ις is ‘a way of being, or habitual state’ like science or virtue, as opposed to διθεσις, a transient disposition (e.g. illness, health, warmth, chilling), and also as opposed to πθς, a simple and superficial affection which quickly passes away. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 483 (#expands, via linked claim)

If I consider the object which I possess, I see that the quality of being possessed does not indicate a purely external denomination marking the object’s external relation to me; on the contrary, this quality affects its very depths; it appears to me and it appears to others as making a part of the object’s being. This is why primitive societies say of certain individuals that they are “possessed”; the “possessed” are thought of as belonging to … This is also the significance of primitive funeral ceremonies where the dead are buried with the objects which belong to them. The rational explanation, “so that they can use the objects,” is evidently after the event. It is more probable that at the period when this kind of custom appeared spontaneously, no explanation seemed to be required. The objects had the specific quality belonging to the deceased. They formed a whole with him; there was no more question of burying the dead man without his usual objects than of burying him without one of his legs. The corpse, the cup from which the dead man drank, the knife which he used make a single dead person. … The custom of burning widows in Malabar can very well be included under this principle; the woman has been possessed; the dead man takes her along with him in his death. In the eyes of the community, by rights she is dead; the burning is only to help her pass from this death by right to death in fact. … We have seen moreover that the destruction of the possessor involves the destruction of the right of the possessed and inversely the survival of the possessed involves the survival of the right of the possessor. The bond of possession is an internal bond of being. I meet the possessor in and through the object which he possesses. This is evidently the explanation of the importance of relics; and we mean by this not only religious relics, but also and especially the totality of the property of a famous man in which we try to rediscover him, the souvenirs of the beloved dead which seem to “perpetuate” his memory. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1366 (#expands, via linked claim)

Thus through a continuous degradation, the bond of creation is maintained between subject and object. To have is first to create. And the bond of ownership which is established then is a bond of continuous creation; the object possessed is inserted by me into the total form of my environment; its existence is determined by my situation and by its integration in that same situation. My lamp is not only that electric bulb, that shade, that wrought iron stand; it is a certain power of lighting this desk, these books, this table; it is a certain luminous nuance of my work at night in connection with my habits of reading or writing late; it is animated, colored, defined by the use which I make of it; it is that use and exists only through it. If isolated from my desk, from my work, and placed in a lot of objects on the floor of a salesroom, my lamp is radically extinguished; it is no longer my lamp; instead, merely a member of the class of lamps, it has returned to its original matter. Thus I am responsible for the existence of my possessions in the human order. Through ownership I raise them up to a certain type of functional being; and my simple life appears to me as creative exactly because by its continuity it perpetuates the quality of being possessed in each of the objects in my possession. I draw the collection of my surroundings into being along with myself. If they are taken from me, they die as my arm would die if it were severed from me. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1371 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Aristotle’s hexis names a stable way of being distinct from transient dispositions and affections — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 483; Possession is a magical relation projecting the ideal of the in-itself-for-itself; Possession is a continuous creation that grants objects their functional being. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1371 (+2 more)

Related

• Possession is a continuous creation that grants objects their functional being. (similarity 0.82)
• Aristotle’s hexis names a stable way of being distinct from transient dispositions and affections (similarity 0.79)
• Possession is a lived, non-thetic relation rather than a known one. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Aristotle’s hexis names a stable way of being distinct from transient dispositions and affections #expands (0.92) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 483
• Possession is an internal bond of being, not an external relation #expands (0.78) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1366
• Possession is a magical relation projecting the ideal of the in-itself-for-itself #expands (0.75)
• Possession is a continuous creation that grants objects their functional being. #expands (0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1371