Group outcomes emerge from decentralized choices and can disappoint every member’s shared preference.

Evidence

These results highlight the fact that the creation of optimally distinct groups does not simply happen because each individual group member desires membership in a group of optimal size. As in the real world, these simulations do not involve an omniscient being who has complete knowledge of the environmental space and can assign group memberships in a way that ensures an optimal group size. Instead, individual agents make choices based on the choices of other agents, and the result can sometimes be less than desired, as was the case in the simulations presented here. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 842

Categorization

• XREF: Echoes the invisible-hand/failure-of-aggregation theme in the Milgrom law-merchant work and Schelling segregation dynamics in the reader’s library.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 842