Group-membership arbitrators tend to be blind to outsiders’ interests

Evidence

One danger occurs, however. The arbitrator may be one of the group and is therefore inevitably conditioned to believe that the needs of the group are and should be the dominant criteria for decision. He may, indeed, be blind to the needs of the rest of us. That is inherently less likely to occur in our formal legal system. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 4858

Categorization

• XREF: Directly pays off the book’s central question of whether dispute resolution is fair for outsiders (Phlusters, third parties, the public) versus insiders engaged in continuing relationships — a recurring inequality-of-position theme. — connects to: Interest-group membership functions as much to exclude outsiders as to unite insiders — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 1992; The nomination of an impartial arbitrator reveals reciprocal coordination between conflicting parties; A party secures allied-group consent by arbitrating between its own and others’ interests — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 662 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Interest-group membership functions as much to exclude outsiders as to unite insiders #corroborates (0.82) — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 1992
• The nomination of an impartial arbitrator reveals reciprocal coordination between conflicting parties #contradicts (0.78)
• A party secures allied-group consent by arbitrating between its own and others’ interests #exemplifies (0.75) — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 662
• Marginal group members display exaggerated haughtiness toward outsiders #corroborates (0.74) — Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, 6689
• Groups prefer to subordinate to strangers or outsiders #contradicts (0.73) — Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, 5612