Group conflict arises from worldview threat to existential meaning

Evidence

The two Churches, whose existence and whose conflict is dependent on the structure and on the whole of history, posed questions which are principles of distinction and internal cohesion for each side, but it could have happened that either of the Churches could have argued what in fact was argued by the other. The principle of distinction and conflict would have been upheld all the same, and it is this problem of distinction and conflict that constitutes the historical problem, and not the banner that happened to be hoisted by one side or the other. — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 1454 (#complicates, via linked claim)

These investigations have not, however, aimed to provide a general definition of group conflict attitudes or to elaborate on the various forms that such attitudes may take. Toward this end, it is suggested that group conflict motives are attitudes directly concerned with the competitive aspects of group relations and attempts to alter those relations. They concern the distribution of scarce values and resources between social groups, as well as attempts to affect the process and pattern of their distribution. More specifically, three types of attitudes reflect group conflict motives: perceptions of incompatible group interests, perceptions and evaluations of relative group standing (fraternal deprivation), and perceived threats or challenges to group interests. Each type of attitude invokes a sense of in-group position vis-à-vis an out-group, and yet, these attitudes are not primarily expressions of intergroup affective orientations or trait beliefs about an out-group (stereotypes). — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3364 (#complicates, via linked claim)

This identification with the in-group, however, has been given relatively little prominence in RCT as a theoretical problem in its own right. The development of ingroup identifications is seen in RCT almost as an epiphenomenon of intergroup conflict. As treated by RCT, these identifications are associated with certain patterns of intergroup relations, but the theory does not focus either upon the processes underlying the development and maintenance of group identity nor upon the possibly autonomous effects upon the in-group and intergroup behavior of these “subjective” aspects of group membership. It is our contention that the relative neglect of these processes in RCT is responsible for some inconsistencies between the empirical data and the theory in its “classical” form. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2674 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Recognizing geopolitics changes the meaning of our actions can shatter one’s sense of existence — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 493; Outgroup difference threatens the death-buffering worldview, driving defensive prejudice — Jeff Greenberg and Spee Kosloff, Terror Management Theory: Implications…, 29; Group conflict becomes tractable only through the local meanings groups assign each other — Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide: The Social…, 1010 (+10 more)

Broader Connections

• Group conflicts serve distinction and cohesion; doctrinal content is interchangeable #complicates (0.82) — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 1454
• Group conflict attitudes reduce to perceived incompatible interests, relative deprivation, and threat #complicates (0.78) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3364
• Realistic conflict theory treats group identity as an epiphenomenon, not an autonomous cause #complicates (0.73) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2674