Greek austerity raised debt ratios while destroying GDP and employment

Evidence

The terms of the deal were very clearly spelled out: the massive loans granted by the creditors to “save the country” would have to be accompanied by a “Memorandum of Understanding” (MoU)—stipulating (extremely) harsh austerity measures. Meanwhile, debt restructuring would remain as economically ineluctable as it was politically intolerable. As a result, the Greek predicament went from bad to worse: GDP fell by 25 percent between 2008 and 2013 and unemployment peaked at 27.5 in 2013, pushing whole sectors of society into poverty. The public debt/GDP ratio, on the other hand, continued to increase: by the end of the 2010s, it still amounted to approximately 185 percent (up from 103 percent in 2007). The weakness of the economic arguments for austerity had always been evident: it rather reflected the power asymmetries within the euro area and the priority given to the protection of French and German creditors. — Arthur Borriello and Anton Jäger, The Populist Moment, 172

Categorization

  • QUESTION: The claim that austerity reflected creditor protection rather than economic logic is worth chasing—what did contemporaneous IMF/French/German analyses actually say?
  • XREF: connects to: Greece lost a quarter of its GDP during the 2010s austerity decade — Arthur Borriello and Anton Jäger, The Populist Moment: The Left After the…, 112; Austerity cuts raised the debt-to-GDP ratios of Eurozone crisis states. — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 30; Austerity failed to reduce Greek debt-to-GDP projections — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 201 (+6 more)

Broader Connections