Gratitude toward nature requires attributing some form of good intent to it

Evidence

Marshaling an impressive array of writings on the concepts of gratitude and gift, Bardsley frames her analysis in terms of what she calls two foci, one related to the gift itself and the other to the source of the gift, the supposed “benefactor.” These are two different elements of consideration, each needing its own analytical attention, although they are interrelated in ways that make them both necessary for each other in order to fulfill the sufficient condition of gratitude. Ultimately, on Bardsley’s own analysis, appreciation for the gift hinges on the gift-giver, the benefactor. The challenge raised with regard to the latter is that the “benefactor, i.e., nature, cannot have—in the atheist view of the world—any intentions, and intentions to benefit someone are deemed essential for feeling gratitude.” To address this challenge, many writers have attributed “something akin to agency to non-sentient elements of the natural world,” in order to bestow on nature qualities “similar enough to intentions.” One such argument draws on the way we are said to appreciate institutions, which have no intentions as such but possess “purposes and functions” as an integral part of their character. Thus, it is argued, one could feel gratitude to character “rather than [to] conscious intentions.” In the final analysis, however, Bardsley recognizes the weakness of such arguments, on the grounds that many people cannot accept that the natural systems “possess anything like good intentions,” which are prerequisites for a “rational” justification for feeling gratitude. The weakness is such that Bardsley’s philosophical bar drops significantly, leading her at the end to be satisfied with the absence of “bad intentions” instead of conscious, deliberate, and proactive ones. Thus, gratitude would be an “appropriate response to undeserved benefits from sources that (a) do not have bad intentions toward us and that (b) are not benefiting us as a result of accidental or regrettable aspects of their character.” — Wael Hallaq, Restating Orientalism, 491

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the two-foci model of gratitude (gift vs. benefactor) and the philosophical requirement of intent for justified gratitude toward nature.
• XREF: Connects to anthropological discussions of gift economies and reciprocity (Mauss), and to debates about whether non-human entities can be moral patients.
• ADDENDUM: Bears on the tree-as-infrastructure essay: gratitude to trees as infrastructure presumes exactly the kind of ‘purposeful’ non-sentient benefactor Bardsley analyzes.