Granting new legal rights can weaken rather than strengthen one’s position.

Evidence

That one’s position can be painfully weakened by new legal powers is poignantly suggested by one of the arguments raised against legalizing euthanasia, granting hopeless incurables the right to authorize their own removal: “What … would be the effect on old people with incurable infirmities who are already suspicious that those around them want to get rid of them?” — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 789

Categorization

• XREF: Connects directly to the reader’s Gambetta/Schelling framework: formal legal empowerment can paradoxically erode bargaining leverage, mirroring how third-party enforcement substitutes for state legitimacy. — connects to: Certain laws provide facilities for realizing wishes instead of imposing duties. — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 175; The discipline-abuse legal line may facilitate rather than prevent abuse. — , The Rod and the Child: A Global History…, 6685; Resistance operates by strategy and struggle, not juridical right — Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 296 (+2 more)
• SEED: An essay angle: ‘when legal rights backfire’ — the inverse of the Mafia substitution problem, where formal empowerment signals intent rather than protecting.

Broader Connections

• The discipline-abuse legal line may facilitate rather than prevent abuse. #exemplifies (0.85) — , The Rod and the Child, 6685
• Certain laws provide facilities for realizing wishes instead of imposing duties. #qualifies (0.75) — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 175