Gramsci’s concepts intentionally operate at concrete historical levels, not abstract generality.

Evidence

Some critics have assumed that Gramsci’s concepts operate at this level of concreteness only because he did not have the time or inclination to raise them to a higher level of conceptual generality—the exalted level at which “theoretical ideas” are supposed to function. Thus both Althusser and Poulantzas have proposed at different times “theorizing” Gramsci’s insufficiently theorized texts. This view seems to me mistaken. Here, it is essential to understand, from the epistemological viewpoint, that concepts can operate at very different levels of abstraction and are often consciously intended to do so. The important point is not to “misread” one level of abstraction for another. We expose ourselves to serious error when we attempt to “read off” concepts which were designed to operate at a high level of abstraction as if they automatically produced the same theoretical effects when translated to another, more concrete, “lower” level of operation. In general, Gramsci’s concepts were quite explicitly designed to operate at the lower levels of historical concreteness. He was not aiming “higher”—and missing his theoretical target! — Stuart Hall, Essential Essays, Volume 2, 80

Categorization

• DEFINE: Establishes the key epistemological distinction between levels of abstraction — concepts are level-specific and must not be misread across levels.
• XREF: This level-of-abstraction framework carries directly into how Islamophobia readings must treat Gramscian concepts like hegemony and common sense as historico-concrete, not abstract-general.