Genuine regard can only reward virtue that is not performed to win regard.

Evidence

As Jon Elster (1983: 66) observes, perhaps with some overstatement, ‘The general axiom in this domain is that nothing is so unimpressive as behaviour designed to impress.’ Thus, to the extent that the regard-based sanctions work, to the extent that they fail to deliver a bad opinion, or actually deliver a good one, they present a flattering image of the agents constrained. The sanctioning system operates on the basis of an optimistic picture of the sorts of person in question. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 1009

Categorization

• DEFINE: Explains the paradox at the heart of optimistacally motivated sanctions: regard rewards only work when not sought.
• XREF: Echoes the coral-reef/peacock display economics literature and Bourdieu on disinterestedness being strategic. — connects to: Trust cannot be demanded but only offered through a risky advance — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 197; Self-regard invested in standards, not the standards themselves, drives moral conduct. — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 221

Broader Connections

• Self-regard invested in standards, not the standards themselves, drives moral conduct. #qualifies (0.80) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 221
• Trust cannot be demanded but only offered through a risky advance #qualifies (0.75) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 197