Friedman’s methodology resists tidy philosophical classification
Evidence
To a reader versed in the philosophy of science, aspects of Friedman’s position especially his insistence that “factual evidence can never `prove’ a hypothesis; it can only fail to disprove it” (p. 9) are immediately reminiscent of the writings of Karl Popper. Economic methodologists question, however, just how close Friedman’s views are to Popper’s, and indeed have found the former hard to classify philosophically. — Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera, 55
Categorization
- XREF: Popperian falsificationism reappears throughout economics-of-science literature; useful framing point. — connects to: Science and philosophy jointly incriminate determined subjects; Classification enables thought but does not itself constitute understanding.; A totalizing theory silently excludes texts that contradict its category — Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory: Nations, Classes, Literatures, 169 (+2 more)
Broader Connections
- Classification enables thought but does not itself constitute understanding.
#qualifies(0.80) - Science and philosophy jointly incriminate determined subjects
#complicates(0.75) - Viewed objectively the Phenomenology fragments into isolated disciplinary data
#exemplifies(0.75) - A totalizing theory silently excludes texts that contradict its category
#complicates(0.72) — Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory, 169