Freedom, for Sartre, is the act’s production, accessible only to imaginative recreation.
Evidence
There the powerlessness of the abstract mind to analyze genuine three-dimensional action was demonstrated; here Sartre shows that even if the actual production of the act by a determinate personality remains inaccessible to analytical thought (and that act of production is what is called freedom in his terminology), nonetheless it is possible to recreate such action imaginatively. — Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form, 431
Categorization
- DEFINE: Sharpens Sartre’s definition of freedom as the production of the act, which analytical thought cannot grasp but narrative can recreate.
- XREF: This dialectic of analytical powerlessness vs. imaginative recreation echoes the critique of abstract reason Jameson develops via the Frankfurt School throughout the book. — connects to: Freedom is meaningful only as engaged by free choice of ends; Freedom has concrete content only when engaged in the world
Broader Connections
- Freedom is meaningful only as engaged by free choice of ends
#qualifies(0.78) - Freedom has concrete content only when engaged in the world
#qualifies(0.78)