Fraser reframes misrecognition as institutional status subordination rather than psychological harm

Evidence

Fraser, on the other hand, argues that this approach to the politics of recognition is too psychologically based; she turns her attention to the social status of individuals and communities, and insists on a structural understanding of misrecognition more as an institutional practice than an individual experience. For Fraser, a focus on social relations, rather than psychology, helps us understand misrecognition as a ‘status injury’ (Fraser 1998: 25). Misrecognition is not freestanding or psychological, but an ‘institutionalized relation of social subordination’ (Fraser 2000: 113). It is this institutional status injury, not psychological damage, which is central to Fraser’s theory of justice. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 76

Categorization

  • DEFINE: The recognition/distribution vocabulary the reader extracts — Fraser’s ‘status injury’ versus Honneth’s psychological condition is a core distinction.
  • XREF: A structural-vs-psychological axis recurs across eco-justice, legal institutions, and how courts recognize harms. — connects to: Misrecognition is a cultural and institutional injustice rooted in representation and communication. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 67; Misrecognition constitutes oppression by imprisoning people in distorted identities — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 69; Fraser distinguishes three institutional forms of misrecognition independent of victims’ feelings — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 77 (+5 more)

Broader Connections