Fraser’s status model lets recognition apply to nature without psychological claims

Evidence

Fraser’s central argument against Honneth is that we need to treat recognition as a question of social status—as a status injury based in social misor malrecognition, not of individual psychological feelings on the part of the victims of injustice. Fraser’s insistence on the status of a group or victim makes the application of recognition as an element of ecological justice much easier. The status model is not aimed at valorizing individual or group identity, or at recognizing the psychological plight of individual victims, but instead at overcoming subordination (Fraser 2000: 114). In this, we can dismiss the criticism that recognition of, for example, the agency or integrity of the natural world necessitates an anthropomorphizing or a psychological need for recognition in the nonhuman world. We can see nature injured, its interests ignored, autonomy dismissed, or its integrity damaged without resorting to such psychological language or conceptions. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 461

Categorization

• DEFINE: Explains the pivotal move: treating recognition as status injury rather than psychological need, which is the linchpin enabling recognition theory to extend to nature.
• XREF: Directly pays off the earlier ch12-16 discussion in book_so_far of Fraser vs Honneth on the status vs psychological model. — connects to: Fraser reframes misrecognition as institutional status subordination rather than psychological harm — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 76; Fraser’s three status forms map cleanly onto harms suffered by nature — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 466; Low and Gleeson’s own distributive principles secretly rest on recognition of nature — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 409 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• Extending community to nature under-theorizes the recognition required #qualifies (0.72) — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 432
• Nature’s misrecognition is socially constructed and socially correctable #expands (0.72) — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 470
• Intentionality gives nature continuity with mind without collapsing difference #qualifies (0.70) — Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 500