Fragmented protection markets breed violent outsider-led succession.

Evidence

According to Arlacchi (1983a) in Calabria the local mafioso is frequently challenged from the outside (26ff.). Similarly, among Neapolitan families the challenge to leadership often comes from audacious young thugs who make it to the top either by disposing of entire firms or by plotting from within against the reigning bosses. The number of protection firms in and around Naples in 1987—as many as fifty-three (see Table 2)—indicates more fragmentation than in Sicily. The mere fact that in an area much smaller than western Sicily there is a disproportionately large number of providers is an indication of a high degree of volatility in the protection market. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 271

Categorization

• XREF: The Naples/Calabria fragmentation-volatility-succesion link is the negative control for the coordinated Sicilian case; the reader’s Gambetta model predicts exactly this contrast in enforcement-market structures.