Forcing Salan underground may have been a tactical error by de Gaulle

Evidence

With hindsight, one might ask whether this was not perhaps a tactical error on the part of de Gaulle; would a Salan out in the open, in Algiers and under Delouvrier’s eye, have proved the lesser liability than the “Mandarin” henceforth taking to the shadows? — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1280

Categorization

• QUESTION: Counterfactual worth chasing: did de Gaulle’s banishment of Salan actually create the outlaw who led the OAS?
• SEED: Could seed an essay on how pushing dissenters out of sight consolidates rather than defuses resistance.
• XREF: connects to: De Gaulle may have countenanced a military takeover as a fallback. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 908; De Gaulle purged senior officers who failed to obey during the crisis — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1136

Related

• De Gaulle may have countenanced a military takeover as a fallback. (similarity 0.82)
• Salan’s public de Gaulle declaration committed the Algerian army against Paris (similarity 0.82)
• Salan was France’s most battle-hardened and decorated soldier. (similarity 0.81)
• Salan was a largely symbolic O.A.S. leader out of daily control (similarity 0.80)
• De Gaulle purged senior officers who failed to obey during the crisis (similarity 0.80)
• Salan accepted full responsibility for O.A.S. atrocities despite nominal control only (similarity 0.79)