For Hegel all nature is second nature, making habit non-anthropological

Evidence

When Hegel reopens the analyses of De Anima does this entail an anthropological conception of habit? The Philosophy of Nature, with its concentration on the notion of ‘organic life’, immediately invalidates such a conclusion. The account developed here shows that, for Hegel, nature is always second nature. In this context, we must reverse the preceding questions: it will be difficult to determine whether in Hegel’s thought there is a privileged place for this reduplication of nature. If all animals are habituated animals, how do we distinguish the boundaries of that exemplary living being called man? — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 492

Categorization

• QUESTION: If all animals are habituated, what exactly distinguishes human from animal nature for Hegel? Worth chasing in the following analysis.
• XREF: Reverses the common assumption that habit is specifically human; bears on the reader’s question of plasticity as a biological vs. human property. — connects to: For Hegel, nature is always already second nature. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 492; Hegel frames self-transformation into second nature as man’s defining attribute; In Hegel fulfilled subjectivity abandons its human and anthropological shape — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 607

Broader Connections

• For Hegel, nature is always already second nature. #corroborates (0.98) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 492
• Hegel frames self-transformation into second nature as man’s defining attribute #contradicts (0.92)
• In Hegel fulfilled subjectivity abandons its human and anthropological shape #corroborates (0.82) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 607