Folk psychology primarily coordinates group roles, not just predicts individual minds.

Evidence

From the evo-devo perspective proposed here, folk psychology might be extended to dyadic interaction, but its primary function is the coordination of roles, activities, and identities within and between groups. (Coordination has been mistaken as a claim about altruism, cooperation, or prosociality. Its use is intended as a neutral descriptive term: even the most heinous violence between groups requires considerable coordination for attack and defense.) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 420 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

The notion that a group may have a mental state has long been rejected in social psychology as a nonscientific fallacy (Allport, 1924). Indeed, researchers would typically face difficulty in providing an operational definition of group mind. However, the findings by Teramae and Karasawa (2008) demonstrate that behavior explanations constructed by ordinary people can easily presuppose intentions associated with beliefs and desires even in a group, as long as the group is perceived to possess a mind-like function. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 154 (#complicates, via linked claim)

The notion that a group may have a mental state has long been rejected in social psychology as a nonscientific fallacy (Allport, 1924). … However, the findings by Teramae and Karasawa (2008) demonstrate that behavior explanations constructed by ordinary people can easily presuppose intentions associated with beliefs and desires even in a group, as long as the group is perceived to possess a mind-like function. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 154 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Folk psychology’s primary function is coordinating group roles, not predicting individual minds. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 420; Folk psychology and theory of mind overlap without being interchangeable or opposed. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 372; Ordinary people readily attribute intentions and desires to groups — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 154 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• Folk psychology’s primary function is coordinating group roles, not predicting individual minds. #corroborates (1.00) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 420
• Ordinary people readily attribute intentions and desires to groups #complicates (0.80) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 154
• Ordinary people readily attribute mental states to groups perceived as mind-like #complicates (0.80) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 154
• Groups are perceived as unitary mindful entities with intentions #complicates (0.76) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 140