Floating exchange rates triumphed despite starting as a minority view even among neoliberals

Evidence

The policy of floating exchange rates, argued first as a minority position not only within the economic mainstream but even within the neoliberal camp, became reality. A process of persuasion which emerged contentiously among neoliberals helped redefine the monetary order of the world. — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 445

Categorization

• XREF: Directly serves the reader’s core goal of fracturing the neoliberal caricature: the camp was internally divided on core doctrine, not monolithic — connects to other authors dissecting intra-neoliberal disputes. — connects to: Neoliberals pushed floating exchange rates and open capital flows that disciplined welfare spending. — Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the…, 792; Neoliberals split into warring factions over fixed versus floating exchange rates — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 41; A fringe economist’s idea for flexible exchange rates went mainstream within two decades — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 440 (+6 more)
• SEED: Angles: the internal genealogy of how a minority heresy became global orthodoxy; or how movement organizers deliberately courted politicians by timing persuasion to crisis windows.
• QUESTION: What specific arguments did the internal minority within the MPS deploy against floating rates, and when did they capitulate?

Broader Connections

• Floating exchange rates preconditioned the rapid liberalization of global capital #expands (0.82) — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 448
• Real-world inflation events converted MPS economists to floating rates #expands (0.78) — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 432
• Early neoliberals favored the gold standard and opposed floating rates #contradicts (0.75) — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 428
• Western Europe diverged from the floating-rate norm via the Bundesbank and EMS #qualifies (0.75) — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 448
• Interwar inflation trauma made floating exchange rates widely unthinkable #complicates (0.72) — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 418
• Floating exchange rates were dismissed as law-breaking behavior until the 1960s #corroborates (0.70) — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 427