Fitness trackers leak geolocation data that serves no user benefit

Evidence

The report also identifies a general pattern of careless security as well as the ability to generate false data. The researchers observed that consumers are likely to be misled and confused, overestimating the extent of security measures and underestimating “the breadth of personal data collected by fitness tracking companies.” As they concluded, “We discovered severe security vulnerabilities, incredibly sensitive geolocation transmissions that serve no apparent benefit to the end user, and… policies leaving the door open for the sale of users’ fitness data to third parties without express consent of the users.” — Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 779

Categorization

• ADDENDUM: Reinforces the incentive-structure reading from ‘Grafting & Growth’ about how infrastructure designed for one purpose gets repurposed for extraction; also directly evidences the tension between user benefit and behavioral surplus central to this book.
• XREF: connects to: Supposedly anonymized location data can identify individuals’ home addresses — Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 543; US health and fitness apps operate outside meaningful health privacy regulation — Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 775; Location and phone-sensor data reveal individuals and moods even when anonymized — Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 766

Broader Connections

• Location and phone-sensor data reveal individuals and moods even when anonymized #expands (0.85) — Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 766