False beliefs mostly persist through social transmission, not individual failings

Evidence

We often think of intelligence as a measure of just this: How effective is a person at drawing reliable inferences under various circumstances? False beliefs presumably indicate that a person is not drawing the right sorts of inferences. … Surely factors of this sort play a role in explaining how false beliefs form. But to focus on individual psychology, or intelligence, is to badly misdiagnose how false beliefs persist and spread. It leads us to the wrong remedies. Many of our beliefs—perhaps most of them—have a more complex origin: we form them on the basis of what other people tell us. We trust and learn from one another. — Cailin O’Connor and James Owen Weatherall, The Misinformation Age, 30

Categorization

• DEEPTHINKING: The book’s central reframing — attributing false belief to intelligence or bias is a misdiagnosis pointing at the wrong remedies; belief is socially constituted.
• XREF: Aligns with the Frankfurt School’s anti-individual account of ideology and with networks-of-trust work like Slug tests of cognitive ability; reverses the common ‘stupidity’ explanation of misinformation. — connects to: Individually rational agents can form collectively irrational groups — Cailin O’Connor and James Owen Weatherall, The Misinformation Age: How False…, 50; Source-trusting alone can split a community into stable opposing epistemic camps — Cailin O’Connor and James Owen Weatherall, The Misinformation Age: How False…, 249; Beliefs with no practical stakes function as pure social identity signals — Cailin O’Connor and James Owen Weatherall, The Misinformation Age: How False…, 308 (+9 more)

Broader Connections

• Shared delusional claims persist because confirmation is socially rewarded #corroborates (0.90) — Naomi Klein, Doppelganger, 363
• Consensual beliefs gain perceived validity and social connection from being shared #corroborates (0.85)
• Beliefs gain validity from social endorsement and shared beliefs create social connection #expands (0.82) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 2367
• Social participation makes contested attention truth more real over time. #corroborates (0.80)
• Confirmation bias cements both reputations and habitual trust #corroborates (0.78) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 677
• Repeated false accusation can generate belief through sheer illocutionary force #expands (0.75) — Mark Fisher (edited by Darren Ambrose), K-Punk, 1466